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1. Introduction 
The distributional effects of agricultural policy, which Alston and James (2002) refer to as 
the “incidence of agricultural policy”, have been studied extensively in the literature. Previous 
studies have analysed how these effects differ among policies (Alston & James, 2002; de 
Gorter & Meilke, 1989; Dewbre, Anton & Thompson, 2001; Gardner, 1983; Guyomard, Mouel 
& Gohin, 2004), how the results change if one includes more agents along the vertical chain 
(Desquilbet & Guyomard, 2002; Sheldon, Pick & McCorriston, 2001) or if one takes into 
account imperfect competition (McCorriston & Sheldon, 1991 and Salhofer & Schmid, 2004), 
imperfections in factor markets (Ciaian & Swinnen, 2006; 2009), or transaction costs and 
constraints in the implementation of the policies (OECD, 2007; de Gorter, 1992; Munk, 1994; 
Vatn, 2001).1  
Early studies focused on policies that were coupled to production decisions, e.g. the price 
intervention or production quotas. After the decoupling of policy support in the late 1990s in 
the US and 2003 in the EU, more recent studies have analysed the impact of decoupled 
subsidies (e.g. Chau & de Gorter, 2005; de Gorter, 2007; Goodwin & Mishra, 2006; 
Hennessy, 1998; 2004; Serra et al., 2005; Sckokai & Moro, 2006). However, only few studies 
have looked at the income distributional effects of the EU Single Payment Scheme (SPS) (e.g. 
Ciaian & Swinnen, 2006, 2008; Courleux, et al., 2008; Kilian & Salhofer, 2008).  
Courleux et al. (2008) and Kilian and Salhofer (2008) find that the impact of the SPS largely 
depends on the ratio of the eligible area to the total number of entitlements. If the allocated 
entitlements are in deficit relative to the eligible area of land, then the SPS benefits farms, the 
SPS is not capitalised into land values. However, if the allocated entitlements are in surplus, 
then the SPS gets capitalised into land values. Additionally, Kilian & Salhofer (2008) show 
that the income distributional effects of the SPS depend significantly on the implementation 
model, i.e. in the variability of the SPS between farms. They show that the larger the SPS 
variation between farms, the higher the capitalisation rate of the SPS may be.2 
According to Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen (2010), a further important determinant of the SPS 
capitalisation is the conditionality of the SPS. In the EU farm eligibility for the SPS is subject 
to cross-compliance and, according to European Commission (2011), also future SPS might 
be subject to the ‘greening’ requirements. Given that both the cross-compliance and the 
                                                        
* Pavel Ciaian and d’Artis Kancs, European Commission, DG Joint Research Centre; Jo Swinnen, 
University of Leuven, LICOS Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance. The views expressed 
in this paper are solely those of the authors and may not under any circumstances be regarded as 
stating an official position of the European Commission. 
1 There are also important empirical studies measuring the impact of agricultural policies on land 
markets (Goodwin, Mishra & Ortalo-Magné, 2003; Lence & Mishra, 2003). 
2 There is a large related literature on the effects of tradability of production quota (Alston, 1981; 
Burrell, 1989; Babcock & Foster, 1992; Guyomard et al., 1996; Sumner & Wolf, 1996; Boots, Oude 
Lansink & Peerlings, 1997; Bureau et al., 1997; Bureau, Guyomard & Requillart, 2001). 
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‘greening’ impose additional costs to land use, the net effect of the SPS rent distribution 
would be lower. 
Conceptually, an important shortcoming of previous studies is that they assume fixed farm 
structure in perfectly competitive markets to investigate the distributional effects of the SPS 
(Courleux et al., 2008; Kilian & Salhofer, 2008). They do not take into account the potential 
adjustments in farm structure, which may be a result of various factors, such as improvement 
in the technology and rural institutions, farm entry and exit, the SPS-induced alleviation of 
farm credit problems and the associated productivity growth, as well as decoupling – which 
accompanied the introduction of the SPS – potentially resulting in the adjustment of the farm 
production mix and farm efficiency, causing a structural adjustment of the farming sector. 
They also do not take into account the presence of market imperfections and institutional 
rigidities, which affect the distributional effects of the SPS however. 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the impacts of decoupled payments on land values in 
the EU – the SPS – by explicitly capturing the income distributional and farm restructuring 
effects in the presence of structural change, such as, exogenous productivity change and farm 
entry/exit, and market imperfections and institutional rigidities. For this purpose we adopt 
the land market model of Ciaian and Swinnen (2006), which allows us to capture farm 
heterogeneity and structural effects of the SPS on rural land markets. 
However, the implications of the SPS may differ if one considers structural change. Even 
though the SPS may be un-distortive in an environment with static farm structure, it still may 
affect adjustments in the agricultural sector in the presence of structural change. Moreover, 
the SPS may interact with farm restructuring by preventing markets from full structural 
adjustments. By neglecting these effects one may under- or over-estimate the true impact of 
the SPS. 
Structural change is a medium- to long-run process, which might interact with and be 
affected by SPS if the policy is in place for a longer duration. Given that recent developments 
in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) suggests a continuation of the SPS into the next EU 
financial period spanning from 2014 to 2020,3 the implementation of the SPS system with 
structural change may have different impacts than those analysed in recent studies without 
structural adjustment (Courleux et al., 2008; Kilian & Salhofer, 2008). 
Our second contribution is in analysing the SPS effects in the presence of market 
imperfections and institutional rigidities. Rural land markets are often constrained by 
various rigidities and imperfections, which may affect land market response to the SPS. The 
two most important imperfections identified in the literature and analysed in the paper are 
credit market imperfections, and land market institutions and regulations (Blancard et al., 
2006; Lee & Chambers, 1986; Färe, Grosskopf & Lee, 1990; Ciaian & Swinnen, 2009; Ciaian, 
Kancs & Swinnen, 2010). 
2. Agricultural policy in the EU  
In 2003 the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) underwent significant reforms. The 2003 
CAP reform decoupled most of the direct payments by introducing the SPS from 2005 
onwards.4 Since then the SPS entitlements have been allocated as a fixed set of payments per 
farm. Farms are entitled to yearly payments, depending on the number of SPS entitlements 
and the eligible land they possess. 
In 2011 the European Commission drafted a proposal for the CAP application for the new 
financial period 2014-20. The main features of the current SPS will remain largely 
                                                        
3 In 2011 the European Commission proposed to maintain the SPS system largely unchanged in the 
next financial period (European Commission, 2011). 
4 MS could choose to introduce the SPS either in 2005 or in 2006. For comparison purposes, the data 
used in this paper covers the period before and after the introduction of SPS in the EU-15 (see below). 
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unchanged. The key difference to the current policy framework is related to stronger linkage 
of the SPS to agricultural practices beneficial to the environment (so-called “CAP greening”).  
2.1 Entitlements 
Under the SPS each farm is allocated a fixed amount of the SPS entitlements. Farms can only 
activate the entitlements and receive the corresponding payments if they are accompanied by 
an equal amount of eligible land.5 This implies that the SPS is indirectly linked to land 
because, in the absence of an eligible amount of land, farms cannot cash in the SPS 
entitlements. However, the SPS is not linked to a specific area of land. An SPS entitlement 
can be activated by any eligible farmland in the region.6 
This setting of subsidy implementation makes the SPS different from a standard area 
subsidy. Under the standard area subsidy farms receive payments for the entire area they 
use, whereas with the SPS only a pre-defined quantity of land (determined by the number of 
entitlements) may obtain payments. The standard area subsidy is implemented in the new 
EU member states (MS). 
2.2 SPS implementation models 
When implementing the SPS, the MS could choose between three different SPS 
implementation models: the historical model, the regional model, and the hybrid model. 
Under the historical model, the SPS is farm-specific and equals the support the farm has 
received in the "reference" period. Under the regional model, an equal per hectare payment is 
granted to all farms in the region. The hybrid model is a combination of historical and 
regional models, it has two versions: a static and a dynamic version. The key difference 
between the three models is in the unit value of entitlements. Under the historical and hybrid 
models the value of entitlement varies between farms (stronger in the former than in the 
latter), whereas under the regional SPS model all farms in a given region received 
entitlements with the same unit value. Currently the most commonly implemented SPS 
model in the EU is the historical model.  
The 2011 Commission's proposal envisages convergence towards a uniform value at MS level 
(or regional level within MS) in the new financial period 2014-20; implying a shift to the 
regional model. However, the proposal introduces additional payments that can supplement 
SPS, such as young farmer payments and payments to farmers located in disadvantaged 
areas. These additional payments may result in variations of per-hectare SPS payments 
across regions and farms within a MS. 
2.3 Cross-compliance requirements 
Farm eligibility for the SPS is subject to cross-compliance. Each farm that receives the SPS 
must comply with the “statutory management requirements”, and maintain the agricultural 
land in “Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition”. The cross-compliance covers 
standards in the field of the environment, land management, food safety, animal and plant 
health and animal welfare, maintenance of soil organic matter and structure, preservation of 
habitats, and water management.  
In the past the statutory management requirements were based on EU directives and 
regulations, such as the Nitrates Directive. The 2003 CAP reform made cross-compliance 
compulsory and extended the coverage of requirements in the fields of environment, public, 
                                                        
5 According to EU regulations, the eligible areas for the activation of payment entitlements include any 
agricultural area used for an agricultural activity or predominantly used for agricultural activities 
(EUR-Lex, 2009). 
6 Under certain conditions MS can also allocate new entitlements from the national reserve but their 
allocation is not automatic. Member states create the national reserve by a linear percentage reduction 
(up to 3%) of their SPS national ceiling. 
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plant health and animal welfare. A farm’s failure to respect these conditions can lead to a 
reduction or a complete stop of the SPS payments. According to current EU regulations, the 
entire land area cultivated by farms receiving the SPS must respect the cross-compliance 
criteria, irrespective of whether all or part of the SPS entitlements are activated and 
irrespective of whether all or part of the agricultural land is used for the activation of the 
entitlements (EC, 2003).7 
According to Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen (2010), adherence to the cross-compliance 
requirements implies additional costs for farms. Given the heterogeneity of farms in the EU, 
the costs related to meeting cross-compliance requirements will have heterogeneous impacts 
on the land markets and hence on the income distributional effects of SPS.  
2.4 CAP ‘greening’ 
The 2011 Commission proposal introduces a ‘greening’ component to decoupled payments, 
according to which a basic SPS payment will be supplemented by additional greening 
payments taking up to 30% of the SPS envelope. The ‘greening’ requires farmers to 
implement agricultural practices beneficial to climate and environment, which go beyond the 
cross-compliance requirements. The CAP greening consists of three main requirements: crop 
diversification, maintenance of permanent grassland and an ecological focus area (set-aside). 
Under crop diversification, farmers’ cultivation of the arable land needs to include at least 
three different crops with the minimum and maximum threshold for each crop being set at 
5% and 70% of the arable land, respectively. Under the maintenance of permanent grassland, 
farmers need to maintain permanent grassland on the areas declared grassland in 2014. The 
ecological focus area requires farms to set aside at least 7% of farmers’ eligible hectares 
(excluding areas under permanent grassland). The areas that qualify as ecological focus area 
include land left fallow, terraces, landscape features, buffer strips, etc. Similar to cross-
compliance, farms’ failure to fulfil the greening requirement may result in a reduction of SPS 
payments.  
2.5 Entitlement tradability 
Generally, entitlements are tradable. However, due to regulatory constraints and market 
imperfections, the tradability of entitlements might be heavily constrained because of 
regulatory restrictions and market imperfections. First, the SPS entitlements are tradable 
only within MS (not among them) and under certain conditions. The general EU regulations 
specify that the lease and similar market transactions with entitlements are allowed only if 
the transferred entitlements are accompanied by an equivalent number of hectares of eligible 
land (European Council, 2003). Farms may transfer their entitlements without land only 
once they have used at least 80% of their payment entitlements during one year, or once they 
have voluntarily given up all unused entitlements to the national reserve in the first year of 
the SPS. If more than 20% of the SPS value is allocated from the national reserve then the 
entitlement cannot be transferred for five years.8 
The tradability of entitlements may also be constrained by market imperfections, such as 
imperfectly functioning rural credit markets or policy uncertainty. Given that the SPS 
represents the right to a future stream of subsidies, a potential buyer would need to pay the 
                                                        
7 The activation of at least one entitlement is sufficient to make cross-compliance obligatory on all 
farmland. Even areas not used for entitlement activation must be farmed in accordance with the cross-
compliance requirements. 
8 The MS can impose additional country-specific restrictions on the transfer of entitlements. For 
example, a MS may decide that payment entitlements may only be transferred or used within a region. 
Member states may also require that in the case of a sale of payment entitlements without land, up to 
50%, and in the case of sale of payment entitlements with land, up to 10% must be reverted to the 
national reserve. In terms of the entitlement tradability France, Portugal and Spain are the most 
restrictive countries (Ciaian, Kancs & Swinnen, 2010). 
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seller the present net value of the future stream of subsidies in competitive markets. 
However, if the buyer is credit constrained, then his/her ability to pay for entitlements is 
reduced, which acts as a tax on entitlement sellers. In addition, policy uncertainty introduces 
a risk component to the entitlement market, because there is uncertainty about the duration 
of the SPS. The current CAP framework and the financial allocation run until 2013. The post-
2013 CAP is subject to negotiation between MS. However, both the implementation of the 
SPS and its budgetary allocation may change in the future. As with credit market 
imperfections, the uncertainty about the future development of the CAP reduces the 
willingness to participate in the entitlement market; the effect of which is similar to an 
entitlement tax.  
3. Conceptual framework 
3.1 Land market model 
The conceptual framework of the present study builds on Ciaian and Swinnen (2006) who 
model area payments (a uniform per hectare payment) in the new MS. We adopt this land 
market model to illustrate the distributional and structural effects of the SPS. The model 
captures farm heterogeneity, which allows an accounting for farm structural change. 
Following Ciaian and Swinnen (2006), to account for farm heterogeneity and the SPS 
variation across farms, we assume that agricultural goods are produced by two types of 
farms.9 The output of each farm type is assumed to be a continuous and increasing function 
of the amount of land used, iA . Output price, p, is assumed fixed and the same for all farms. 
The entire land is owned by landowners, who rent it to farmers.10  
Farms maximize profits, i∏ , which is the difference between sales revenue and land rent:  
iiii wAApf −=∏ )(  
where w is rental rate and ( )i if A  is a well-behaved production function with 0iAf > , 0iAAf < . 
Farms compete for land by renting the amount of land that maximizes their profits: 
wpf iA =  
TAAA =+ 21  
Equation 0 represents the marginal conditions of land, and equation 0 determines the 
equilibrium in the land market, where the total agricultural land (AT) is assumed to be fixed.11 
Graphically, the land market is illustrated in upper panel of Figure 1. The horizontal axis 
shows the quantity of land, the amount of land rented by farm 1 (A1) is shown from the left to 
right on the horizontal axis, whereas the amount of land rented by farm 2 (A2) is shown from 
the right to left with A2 = AT – A1. The vertical axis measures the rental price and subsidies. 
The initial land demands of farm 1 and farm 2 are given by downward sloping curves D1 and 
                                                        
9 Implicitly, we assume that farm 1 represents n farms of the same type and farm 2 represents m farms 
of the same type. A similar approach was applied by Courleux, et al. (2008) by assuming two profit 
maximizing producers in the agricultural economy. 
10 This distinction between landowners and farmers is convenient for our explanation but is not 
essential for the analysis and the derived results. 
11 This assumption does not affect the general results of the model. Non-fixed land supply with positive 
elasticity implies that derived capitalisation rates of SPS, if any, (see further) are lower than with fixed 
land supply. However, due to low elasticity of land supply (Salhofer, 2001) the downward adjustment 
of the SPS capitalisation rate is probably small. In empirical studies the land supply elasticity is usually 
found to be rather low, mostly due to natural constraints. For example, based on an extensive 
literature review, Salhofer (2001) concludes that a plausible range of land supply elasticity for the EU 
is between 0.1 and 0.4. For more details on the implication of non-fixed land supply on SPS 
capitalization, see Courleux et al. (2008). 
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D2, respectively, derived from the marginal conditions 0. Without the SPS, the equilibrium 
set of land allocation and land rent is (A*, w*). Farm 1 rents A* hectares of land (A1 = A*) and 
farm 2 rents A2 = AT – A* hectares of land.  
3.2 Introducing the SPS 
We extend the land market model of Ciaian and Swinnen (2006) by introducing the SPS. Let 
us denote the endowment of the SPS entitlements of type 1 owned by farm 1 by 1EA , and its 
unit face value by t1 (Figure 1). Analogously, 2EA  (= E
T AA − ) is the endowment of 
entitlements of type 2 owned by farm 2 and t2 is its unit face value.  
In the presence of the SPS, farm i‘s profit maximization problem 0 changes as follows:  
( ) ( ) jETjtjiEAiEitiEAiiiiiiii AptAApAtAAcwAApf −+−++−−=∏ γγ)()(  
subject to the entitlement activation constraint ijET
i
EA AAA ≤+ γ  for i, j = 1 and 2; 
where )( ii Ac  are cross-compliance costs (which may vary with land use iA ), iEAA  is the 
number of activated entitlements of type i, jETA  is the total number j entitlements purchased 
and activated by farm i , iEA  is the initial entitlement endowment, itp  is the entitlement 
price, and γ  captures the tradability of entitlements: 0=γ  implies non-tradable 
entitlements, while 1=γ  implies fully tradable entitlements.12 The entitlement activation 
constraint ijET
i
EA AAA ≤+ γ  represents the fact that farms can activate entitlement payments 
only, if accompanied by the necessary amount of land. Note that farm i initially owns iEA  
entitlements, part ( )iEAiE AA −  of which may be sold or unused.13 Conversely, farm i can 
acquire entitlements jETA  by purchasing from farm j. The total endowment of entitlements, 
j
E
i
E AA + , may or may not exceed the total land, AT, implying that they may be in surplus, 
Tj
E
i
E AAA >+ , or in deficit, TjEiE AAA <+ .  
Farm i’s decision variables include: the amount of rented land, iA , the number of activated 
entitlements , iEAA , of type i and the number of purchased and activated entitlements, 
j
ETA , of 
type j. Farms compete for land by renting the amount of land that maximizes their profits. 
The FOC and market clearing conditions yield 0 as well as: 
(1) iiiA cwpf λ−+=   for i = 1 and 2 
(2) iiit tp λγ −≤     for i = 1 and 2 
(3) ijjt tp γλγγ −≤     for i = 1 and 2 
(4) 212121 EEETETEAEA AAAAAA +≤+++  
(5) TETETEAEA AAAAA ≤+++ 2121  
                                                        
12 In reality, none of the two extreme situations may hold – the entitlements are likely to be partially 
tradable. However, partial tradability of entitlements does not change the main intuition of the 
distribution SPS effects derived in this paper. The two extreme cases considered in this paper 
represent upper and lower bound entitlement tradability.  
13 If entitlements are not tradable, 0=γ , the difference iEAiE AA −  represents unused entitlements, 
whereas if they are tradable, 1=γ , then it represents unused entitlement if their price is zero (e.g. this 
may occur with surplus entitlement); otherwise the difference represents traded entitlements. 
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where iλ  are the LaGrangean multipliers associated with the entitlement activation 
constraint ijET
i
EA AAA ≤+ .14 Equation (1) represents the marginal condition of land. 
Equations (2) and (3) determine the entitlement price if entitlements are tradable, 1=γ . The 
entitlement price varies between zero (if ii t=λ ) and its face value (if 0=iλ ) and it may differ 
between the two type of entitlements if ji tt ≠ . The entitlement activation constraint is 
binding if 0>iλ . Equation (4) determines the equilibrium in the entitlement market, which 
constrains the aggregate number of activated entitlements by farm 1 and farm 2 (
2121
ETETEAEA AAAA +++ ) to the level not higher than the total entitlement endowment (
21
EE AA + ). Equation (5) constrains the total amount of activated entitlements by farms to be 
no higher than the total land. 
In equilibrium, the equality of either equation (4) or equation (5) will hold depending on the 
total endowment of entitlements. If the total endowment of entitlements is lower than the 
total area, TjE
i
E AAA <+ , then the total activated entitlements will equal the total stock of 
entitlements (equation (4)), but not all areas will benefit from the SPS (equation (5)). 
Otherwise, if TjE
i
E AAA >+ , then the activated entitlements will equal the total land 
(equation (5)), but not all entitlements will be activated (equation (4)). Equation (5) is linked 
to farms’ activation constraints ijET
i
EA AAA ≤+ γ . If activation constraints are binding for both 
farms ( 0>iλ ), then equality (5) holds in equilibrium. In the reverse case with non-binding 
activation constraints for at least one farm ( 0=iλ ), inequality (5) holds in equilibrium.  
The SPS creates kinks in the land demand functions of farms. Farms do not receive the SPS 
for the land that they rent above the amount of the entitlements they own, i.e. above AE1 and 
AE2 (= AT – AE).15 In this case, farm i’s willingness to pay for land is not affected by the SPS. 
For additional land farm i cannot pay more than the marginal profitability of land. In the 
reverse case, when farm i rents less land than its eligible area AEi, the marginal profitability of 
land is increased by the value of entitlement, it . Now farms are willing to pay a higher rent 
up to it . Otherwise the payment is lost to farms. Graphically, the introduction of the SPS is 
illustrated in Figure 1 (upper panel). Starting from the left-hand side and following the thick 
full lines, the land demand of farm 1 is given by Dt1 D1, whereas the land demand of farm 2 is 
given by D2 Dt2.  
Farm i receiving the SPS is subject to cross-compliance costs, ci.16 Given that the entire 
cultivated area of land receiving the SPS must respect the cross-compliance regulations 
irrespective of whether all or part of the SPS entitlements are activated and irrespective of 
whether all or part of the land is used for the activation of entitlements (European 
Commission, 2003), cross-compliance costs, ic , are linked to land, not to entitlements.17 In 
                                                        
14 For the sake of simplicity, when indexing variables with i we refer to both farms. We drop the text 
'for i = 1 and 2'.  
15 AE is used as support to indicate on the horizontal axes the stock of type 2 entitlements given that the 
area and entitlements of farm 2 are measured from right to left on the figures. 
16 For simplicity, in graphical analysis we assume homogenous cross-compliance costs across farms, ci 
( 21 cc == ). In reality, however, the heterogeneity in farms' natural endowment, production structure 
and technology determines the actual costs of cross-compliance, which each farm incurs by complying 
with the requirements. Moreover, the cross-compliance costs can also vary between the MS, regions, 
and cross-compliance instruments (Alliance Environment, 2007). We discuss the implication of the 
heterogeneous cross-compliance costs (see below). 
17 We implicitly assume that cross-compliance costs are lower than the entitlement value, i.e. ii tc < . 
Otherwise, farms would not enter the SPS programme and would not own entitlements.  
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Figure 1 cross-compliance costs result in a downward shift of land demand functions of farm 
1 and farm 2 to Dtc1 Dc1 and Dc2 Dtc2, respectively. 
The lower panel in Figure 1 shows the entitlement market. The horizontal axis shows the 
quantity of entitlements. The vertical axis measures the entitlement face value and their 
price. Farm i's maximum willingness to pay for an entitlement is determined by the face 
value of the entitlement (given by equations (2) and (3)). This is represented by horizontal 
curves G1 and G2 for entitlements 1 and 2, respectively. The entitlement supply is determined 
by the total endowment: i.e. AE1 and AE2 (= AT - AE) for entitlement 1 and 2, respectively. In 
Figure 1 the supply of entitlements 1 and 2 is represented by curves S1 and S2, respectively. 
4. Static farm structure 
4.1 Entitlement stock effect 
The entitlement excess stock (relative to the eligible area) increases the capitalisation of the 
SPS and hence the landowners' policy gains, whereas the excess supply of eligible land 
reduces the capitalisation of the SPS. In the extreme case, the excess supply of land may drive 
the SPS capitalisation to zero, whereas the entitlement excess stock may lead to full 
capitalisation of the SPS into land values. A related analysis has been carried out by Courleux 
et al. (2008) and Kilian and Salhofer (2008). For the sake of tractability, graphically, we 
analyse the two extreme cases, but the results hold generally, also for intermediate cases. The 
difference in distributional effects between the deficit and surplus stock of entitlements 
(relative to the eligible area) can best be seen without entitlement tradability ( 0=γ ), in the 
absence of ‘greening’ and cross-compliance requirements in perfectly competitive land 
markets, which is shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2.  
Under the deficit stock of entitlements,18 the entitlement endowment of farms (AE1 and AE2, 
respectively) is strictly smaller than the eligible area, implying that farm i's activation 
constraint is not binding (i.e. 0=iλ ).19 Given that 0=iλ  (and with 0=ic  and 0=γ ), farm 
i's marginal condition of land is not affected by the SPS, ti, implying that the SPS 
capitalisation rate is zero.20 The equilibrium marginal value product of land is the same both 
with and without the SPS, 
deficit
SPS
i
Apf 0>  (equation (1)) and 0=SPS
i
Apf  (equation 0), respectively. 
Given that 
00 =>
=
SPS
i
A
deficit
SPS
i
A pfpf , the SPS does not affect land rents relative to no SPS situation, 
00 =>
=
SPS
deficit
SPS
ww . 
Graphically, the deficit entitlement stock effect is shown in Figure 1 (upper panel). The land 
demands without the SPS are D1 D1 and D2 D2 and the land market equilibrium is at (A*, w*). 
The SPS shifts them to Dt1 D1 and D2 Dt2, for farm 1 and farm 2, respectively. This implies that 
with deficit entitlements the equilibrium with and without the SPS is the same at (A*, w*). 
Both the equilibrium land demand and prices are not affected by the SPS. The SPS has a 
                                                        
18 For deficit entitlements we refer to a situation where at least one farm has fewer entitlements than 
the eligible area and it holds that TEE AAA <+ 21 , whereas for surplus entitlements we refer to the 
reverse situation where at least one farm has more entitlements than the eligible area and it holds that 
T
EE AAA >+ 21 . 
19 In our model we assume that the entire land (AT) is eligible for activation of the SPS entitlements. 
According to EU regulations, the eligible areas for the activation of payment entitlements include any 
agricultural area used for an agricultural activity or predominantly used for agricultural activities 
(EUR-Lex 2009). 
20 The analytical derivation of the optimal conditions is cumbersome because of the discontinuity in 
the demand functions with SPS. 
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zero-distortive marginal effect on farm rental decisions. This implies zero capitalisation of 
the SPS and that all policy rents (given by area BC) go to farms; landowners do not benefit 
from the SPS. 
Next, assume that under the surplus entitlements (entitlements are more than the eligible 
area) farms 1 and 2 receive entitlements such that (upper panel in Figure 2).21 
Given that entitlements are in surplus and farms need land to activate their entitlements, 
activation constraints are binding (i.e. 0>iλ ). Profit maximizing farms will compete for land 
in order to activate their unused entitlements. Competing farms will underbid the market 
price for land until its marginal profitability (including the SPS). Given that 0>iλ , from 
FOC (2) it follows that ii t=λ . The combination of FOC (2) and marginal condition of land (1) 
(with 0=ic  and 0=γ ) implies that in equilibrium the farm rental decisions are impacted by 
the SPS: 
surplus
SPS
ii
A tpf 0>+ . The SPS increases the willingness to pay for rent compared to a 
situation without the SPS (equation 0), implying 
00 =>
>+
SPS
i
A
surplust
SPS
ii
A pftpf  and hence 
00 =>
>
SPS
surplus
SPS
ww . As a result, the SPS will be capitalised into land rents. 
In Figure 2 (upper panel), land demands without the SPS are D1 D1 and D2 D2 for farms 1 and 
2, respectively. With the SPS their respective land demands shift to Dt1 D1 and Dt2 D2, the 
equilibrium shifts from (A*, w*) to (At*, wt*). In equilibrium the rental rate increases by wt* - 
w*, meaning that the SPS is reflected in higher rents. Hence, under the excess stock of 
entitlements, the SPS gets capitalised into land rents.22 Landowners’ gains are equal to area 
EFHK, while farms’ gains are equal to area C.  
4.2 SPS implementation models 
The capitalisation of the SPS and hence landowners' gains might decrease in the variation of 
the face value of entitlements, as long as the capitalisation rate is positive. Under the current 
implementation, the variation in the face value of entitlements is determined by the SPS 
model. Under the regional model, the entitlements’ face value is equal among all farms in a 
given region, ji tt = , implying that capitalisation may be larger than under the hybrid or 
historical models, where the face value of entitlements varies among farms, ji tt ≠ . The 
European Commission’s (2011) proposal envisages the equalisation of payments across farms 
in a given region (i.e. regional model). However, it also aims to introduce new measures 
allowing for a variation of payments, such as young farmer payments and payments to 
farmers located in disadvantaged areas. Their impact on land markets is similar to the 
historical/hybrid model. A related analysis has been done by Kilian and Salhofer (2008). In 
order to better illustrate the distributional effects, we consider surplus entitlements, no 
entitlement tradability ( 0=γ ), zero cross-compliance requirements and no ‘greening’ 
requirements. 
                                                        
21 Several factors may lead to a situation whereby the number of entitlements exceeds the eligible area 
in the medium run, i.e. agricultural land conversion to non-agricultural use, or the allocation of new 
entitlements to farms (e.g. entrants). The relative stock of entitlements tends to be larger in countries 
that implement the hybrid model than in countries using the historical model. This is because under 
the historical model the total number of entitlements corresponds to the number of hectares that 
generated subsidies in the reference period. Under the hybrid model (or the regional model), the total 
number of entitlements is equal to all land declared eligible at the time of the SPS’ introduction. 
22 This result is driven, among other things, by the assumption of competitive markets where farms 
compete for land.  If a farm were not willing to pay higher rent, landowners could always find another 
farm with some unused entitlements willing to pay this rent. 
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Given that we consider the case with surplus entitlements, the activation constraints are 
binding (i.e. 0>iλ ). From equations (2) and (3) it follows that with surplus entitlements the 
SPS affects the marginal condition of each farm differently, depending on the variation in 
entitlement value, wtpf iiA =+ . Compared to a situation without the SPS, farm willingness to 
pay for land renting (at the equilibrium land use without the SPS, A*) is higher for the farm 
possessing high value entitlements as opposed to the farm possessing low value entitlements, 
jj
A
ii
A tpftpf +≠+  if ji tt ≠ . The competition for the fixed supply of land will lead to a situation 
whereby the farm with high value entitlements will out-compete the farm owning low-value 
entitlements. As a result, the farm with high-value entitlements will gain, whereas the other 
farm will not benefit from the SPS. Given that farms benefit from the SPS, landowners 
capture policy gains only partially. With reducing variation in entitlement value across farms, 
the SPS capitalisation increases and farmers’ gains go down. In the extreme, which is the case 
of regional model with uniform surplus entitlements, all farms are equally affected by the SPS 
at the margin, jjA
ii
A tpftpf +=+  if ji tt = , implying that the SPS gets fully capitalised into land 
rents and all policy benefits are leaked to landowners.   
Graphically, the income distributional effects are illustrated in Figure 2 (upper panel). 
Entitlements t1 ≠ t2 represent the case of hybrid/historical SPS model. As shown in the 
previous section, the equilibrium capitalisation amount with t1 and t2  is wt* - w*. The 
relationship between the level of marginal capitalisation rate and the face value of 
entitlements is negative. High value entitlement, t1 (> t2), is partly reflected in higher rents 
(wt* - w* < t1), whereas low value entitlement, t2, is fully incorporated into land values (wt* - 
w* = t2). In other words, the capitalisation level of the SPS, expressed in monetary terms, w* - 
wt*, is equal for both entitlements. However, the capitalisation rates, expressed per unit of the 
SPS, vary between entitlements: low-value entitlement, t2, is fully capitalised, whereas high 
value entitlement, t1, is partially capitalised into land rents. The distributional effects of the 
SPS are asymmetric: landowners' gains are equal to area EFHK, farm 1 gains area C, whereas 
farm 2 does not benefit from the SPS. 
The regional SPS model with equal face value of entitlements, t1 = t12, is shown in Figure 2 
(upper panel).With t1 and t12 land demands are Dt1 D1 and Dt12 D2 and market equilibrium is 
at (A*, wt1*), implying that both entitlements are fully incorporated in higher land values, wt1* 
- w*  = t1 = t12. The equalisation of entitlement face value strips away the policy gains of farms 
possessing high value entitlements (area C for farm 1 with t2 < t1). Now all SPS benefits go to 
landowners represented by area CEFGHK, which equals the total value of disbursed SPS 
payments. Farms have zero policy benefits.  
4.3 Cross-compliance effect 
Cross-compliance requirements reduce the capitalisation of the SPS and hence policy rents to 
farmers and/or landowners. Under certain circumstances, cross-compliance requirements 
may drive the capitalisation to zero or even negative values because they create an additional 
cost for farms by imposing constraints on farm activities, for example, with the aim of 
promoting environmentally friendly farming practices.23 The fulfilment and the relevance of 
these requirements vary by farm, as the heterogeneity in farms' natural endowment, 
production structure, geographical location and technology determines the actual costs of 
cross-compliance that each farm incurs by complying with the requirements. Moreover, the 
cross compliance costs can also vary between the MS, regions, and cross-compliance 
instruments (Alliance Environment, 2007; European Commission, 2007b).24  
                                                        
23 The empirical evidence suggests that cross-compliance requirements imply additional costs not only 
for farms, but also for public administrations managing the SPS (Ciaian, Kancs & Swinnen, 2010). 
24 According to the European Commission (2007b), a farmer’s administrative costs of SPS in Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy and Ireland were calculated in the range 5-29 euro/ha. This represents 
between 3 and 9% of the total SPS payments. 
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We show the distributional effects of cross-compliance with surplus and deficit entitlements 
separately, as their effects are very different. As above, we assume non-tradable entitlements 
( 0=γ ) and no greening requirements. 
First, in Figure 2 (upper panel) we consider the entitlement excess stock. In the previous 
section we have shown that with zero cross-compliance costs and entailments t1 and t2, the 
land demands with the SPS are Dt1 D1 and Dt2 D2, for farm 1 and farm 2, respectively, and the 
land market equilibrium is at (At* wt*). The SPS amount equal to wt* - w* is capitalised into 
land rents. Next, consider a situation with positive cross-compliance costs. As noted above, 
the additional cross-compliance costs are linked to land, implying that cross-compliance 
costs reduce the profitability of land. The equilibrium conditions (1) and (2) (with 0>iλ  and 
0=γ ) imply that for surplus entitlements and positive cross-compliance costs wctpf iiiA =−+
. Comparing the two cases with and without the cross-compliance costs, in equilibrium it 
holds that 
surplus
0
surplus
0 => +<−+ ciiAciiiA tpfctpf  and hence 
surplus
0
surplus
0 => < cc ww . In other words, farms' 
equilibrium marginal product of land is reduced by cross-compliance costs, which reduces 
the willingness to pay for rent, causing a downward adjustment in land rents. 
In Figure 2 (upper panel) positive cross-compliance costs shift the land demand curves 
downward from Dt1 D1 and Dt2 D2 to Dtc1 Dc1 and Dtc2 Dc2 (dotted lines), for farm 1 and farm 2, 
respectively. The equilibrium shifts from (At* wt*) to (At* wc*). Overall, the cross compliance 
costs reduce land rental price, implying that the capitalisation level is also lower (by wt*- wc*) 
relative to a situation with zero cross-compliance costs and entitlements in place, wc* - w*  < 
wt* - w* . The total value of cross-compliance costs is given by area EH and represents a 
reduction of policy rents to landowners. Landowners' policy gains decrease from area EHFK 
with zero cross-compliance costs to area FK with positive cross-compliance costs.  
Deficit entitlements are illustrated in Figure 1 (upper panel). Land demands with zero cross-
compliance costs are Dt1 D1 and D2 Dt2, for farm 1 and farm 2, respectively, and the land 
market equilibrium is at (A*, w*), which is the same as without the SPS. With positive cross-
compliance costs and deficit entitlements (and with 0=iλ  and 0=γ ), equations (1) and (2) 
imply that farm i‘s marginal condition of land is affected by cross-compliance costs, i.e. 
wcpf iiA =− , implying that the SPS capitalisation could be negative. Comparing the two cases 
with and without cross-compliance costs, in equilibrium it holds that 
deficit
c
i
A
deficit
c
ii
A pfcpf
00 =>
<−  and 
hence 
deficit
c
deficit
c
ww
00 => < . In Figure 1 (upper panel) the cross-compliance costs, c ( 021 >== ccc ), 
shift land demands of farm 1 and farm 2 to Dtc1 Dc1 and Dc2 Dtc2, respectively, and land rent 
drops from w* to wc*, relative to zero cross-compliance costs and deficit entitlements, and 
relative to a situation without the SPS. Hence, cross-compliance costs lead to negative 
capitalisation of SPS. The total value of cross-compliance costs is given by area D, all of which 
are incurred to landowners.  
The situation is shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, where landowners fully bear the costs 
through reduced land rents, although cross-compliance costs are incurred by farms. First, 
this is because they are directly linked to land use and hence act as a land tax. Second, it is 
because in both figures we assume cross-compliance costs constant and equal among farms. 
In reality they may change (increase or decrease) with land renting too as they may differ by 
farm type. In the first case, landowners loose proportionally more (less) than the total value 
of cross-compliance costs, if these increase (decrease) with land quantity, they generate a 
gain (loss) to farms. In the second case, if the cross-compliance costs differ by farm type, they 
may affect farms asymmetrically. Cross-compliance costs may also affect farm restructuring 
and may lead to a land-relocation-induced income redistribution similar to a productivity 
change, which is shown in section 5. 
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4.4 CAP ‘greening’ effect 
The CAP ‘greening’ requirements affect land productivity as they may constrain farmers on 
crop planting and use of land. In the case of crop diversification, farms may be required to 
relocate land between crops if they do not have at least three crops on their land, or if the 
minimum and/or the maximum threshold are not respected, which implies that for a 
marginal hectare farms may plant a higher share of a less profitable crop to respect the crop 
diversification requirement. This leads to a reduction in marginal land profitability and hence 
in the reduction of the willingness to pay for land rent. The implications of the permanent 
grassland requirement are similar. If it would be optimal for farm to convert grassland to 
other uses in the absence of the SPS, then the ‘greening’ requirement will constrain farms 
from doing so, causing a downward adjustment of land profitability. The ecological focus area 
requires 7% of the area to be withdrawn from production, which directly cuts the return from 
each additional hectare. The CAP ‘greening’ effect has not been considered in other studies in 
the literature. 
Heterogeneity in farms production structure, specialisation and technology determines the 
actual impact of the CAP ‘greening’. Some farms may not need to adjust to all three greening 
requirements, for some farms the greening may not be a constraining factor if, for example, 
their production structure is sufficiently diversified, they have no incentive to convert 
grassland to other uses and possess strips of land that are economically not suitable for 
production. For some other farms, in particular those specialised in growing a single crop 
and with no fallow land, the adjustment in production structure might be required. This 
implies that the greening impact can vary between the MS, regions and farms.  
The impact of the CAP greening on land markets is analogous to the impact of cross-
compliance costs. Both requirements induce explicit or implicit costs to farms and reduce the 
willingness to pay for land renting. As a result, the CAP greening probably reduces the 
capitalisation of the SPS and policy rents to farmers and/or landowners. As with cross-
compliance, under certain circumstances, the CAP greening may drive the capitalisation to 
zero or even into a negative balance. Given that the distributional effects are similar to cross-
compliance the derivations of the effects are not repeated. 
4.5 Entitlement tradability 
Up to now we have assumed that entitlements cannot be traded among farms. In this section 
we relax this assumption and analyse the entitlement price formation. Trade allows farms to 
exchange entitlements, if they possess more/less than the eligible area. The market 
determines the entitlement price, pti, which may differ from its face value to zero, depending 
on SPS capitalisation into land rents. To illustrate how the price of entitlements is correlated 
with the SPS capitalisation, we consider two cases: zero capitalisation of the SPS (deficit 
entitlements) and positive capitalisation of the SPS (surplus entitlements). To simplify the 
analysis, we assume zero cross-compliance costs ( 0=ic ) and no greening requirements. A 
related analysis has been performed by Courleux et al. (2008) and Kilian & Salhofer (2008). 
In the case of deficit entitlements ( TEE AAA <+ 21 ) the entitlement constraint is not binding, 
0=iλ . Equilibrium conditions (2) and (3) imply that the price of entitlements will equal their 
face value, pti= ti. As shown in the previous section, equilibrium conditions (2) – (5)  imply 
that the SPS is not capitalised into land rents, because the marginal condition of land is not 
affected by the SPS, wpf iA = . The effects are illustrated in Figure 3. With deficit entitlements 
the equilibrium with and without the SPS is the same at (A*, w*), and all SPS benefits go to 
farmers (area BC) (upper panel). Under this distribution of entitlements there is no trade of 
entitlements, although the implicit equilibrium price of entitlements is equal to their face 
value, given by the intersection of entitlement supply S1 for farm 1 and S2 for farm 2 and 
entitlement value G1 for farm 1 and G2 for farm 2, respectively (lower panel). This is because 
each unit of entitlement generates to its owner (farmer) a gain equal to its face value. Selling 
the entitlement below the face value, pti < ti, would attract buyers because of positive profits. 
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Competition among buyers would drive the price up such that pti=ti, because entitlements are 
in deficit relative to the total land (i.e. strict inequality holds in equilibrium for equation 
(5)).25 
Trade in entitlements will take place if some farms hold surplus entitlements.26 For example, 
if the stock of entitlements of farm 2 is in surplus relative to its optimal land use without the 
SPS at AE12 where  AE12 > AE2 and AE12 = AT - AE1 > AT - A*, while the overall entitlement stock 
is still in deficit, TEE AAA <+ 211 , the land market equilibrium is the same at (A*, w*) (upper 
panel in Figure 3).  Given that farm 2 owns more entitlements than the optimal land use AT - 
A*, it has incentives to sell the surplus amount A* - AE1. In contrast, given that farm 1 owns 
fewer entitlements than its optimal land use, it is willing to buy additional entitlements. If 
farm 2 would not sell the surplus entitlements and would instead rent an equivalent area AT - 
AE1,27 the equilibrium rent would be w2 because of higher marginal return of farm 1 at AE1. 
Farm 2 benefits from the marginal entitlement at AE1 are equal to t2 – (w2 – w1). If however 
farm 2 sells the marginal entitlement for price pt2', such that t2 – (w2 – w1) < pt2' , and farm 1 
buys the entitlement, then farm 2 gains from trade. 
The difference, w2 - w1, is the marginal productivity loss due to suboptimal land renting at 
AE1 and it represents the total gains of entitlement trade. Because the total amount of 
entitlements is in deficit (inequality (5) holds in equilibrium), the competition of farm 1 will 
lead to an equilibrium entitlement price equal to its face value, pt2=t2 (lower panel in Figure 
3).28 This holds for all area in the interval AE1, A*. In equilibrium all entitlements are activated 
(i.e. strict equality holds for equation (4)). Overall, farm 2 sells all surpluses entitlement A* - 
AE1 to farm 1 and its equilibrium renting will stay at AT - A*. Area BC represents the aggregate 
gains of trade. The rationale behind this result is that farm 2 does not have incentive to keep 
the surplus entitlements because the productivity loss (area BC) due to suboptimal land use 
would cut part of the gains of holding them, whereas the equilibrium entitlement price allows 
farm 2 to fully benefit from the surplus entitlements. The entitlement price equals its face 
value, because the SPS is not capitalised into land rents. This is because entitlements are 
scarce relative to the total land that can be used to activate the payment associated with 
them. All policy benefits (area B to farm 1 and area (AT - AE1)t2 to farm 2) are distributed to 
farmers.  
The case with surplus entitlements is illustrated in Figure 2. With surplus entitlements t1 and 
t2, , the equilibrium is at (At*, wt*) and part of the SPS, wt* - w*, is capitalised into 
land rents. The entitlement of farm 2 is fully capitalised whereas the entitlement of farm 1 is 
partially capitalised into land rents, implying that the price will differ among the two types of 
entitlements. With activation binding constraint ( 0>iλ ), from equations (2) and (3) it follows 
that in equilibrium the difference in entitlement face values is equal to the difference in their 
prices, jt
i
t
ji pptt −=− . With ( ) wptpf iiiA =−+  (equations (1) and (2)), the price for entitlement, 
ip , represents the part of the entitlement face value, which is not capitalised into land rents. 
In Figure 2 (lower panel) entitlements of farm 2 will have zero equilibrium price pt2 = 0, 
because they are fully reflected in higher rents (wt* - w* = t2), and because entitlements are in 
surplus relative to land, 0>iλ  (equality (5) holds in equilibrium) (the maximum willingness 
to pay for entitlement 2, G1, intersects the supply of entitlement 1, S1) Competition among 
sellers drives their price down to zero: some entitlements will not be traded. Buyers (farm 1) 
                                                        
25 Note that we assume that farm 1 represents n farms of the same type and farm 2 represents m farms 
of the same type implying that there is no duopoly on the land rental and entitlement market. 
26 This may occur due to structural change, for example (see below). 
27 Note that the activation of SPS requires that each entitlement is accompanied by an equivalent 
number of hectares. 
28 Note that although entitlements of farm 1 are not traded, their implicit equilibrium price is pt1=t1. 
This follows from equations (3). 
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do not have any incentive to buy additional entitlements, because they do not have land for 
their activation (inequality (4) hold in equilibrium). However, the equilibrium price of 
entitlements of farm 1 is positive and equals its face value net of capitalisation rate, pt1 = t1 – 
(wt* - w*) (= wt1* - wt*). Selling entitlements below this price would attract buyers because of 
positive profits for its owner. Hence, these benefits are only partially passed through to 
landowners through higher land rents (in contrast to entitlements of farm 2). This result 
holds as long as entitlements of type 1 are in deficit relative to the total area of land, AE1 < AT.  
Note that in the case illustrated in Figure 2, the actual entitlement trade will not take place, 
because the stock of entitlements of farm 1 is equal to its optimal land use. Under a different 
distribution of entitlements, where farm 1 would own surplus entitlements, trade would 
occur with farm 2 purchasing entitlements from farm 1 at price pt1 = wt1* - wt* and, as long as 
AE1 < AT, there would be no changes in the equilibrium land rental price and land use. 
If the face value of both entitlements is equal, (as under the regional SPS model), the price of 
entitlement owned by farm 1 will drop to zero. This is illustrated for t12 in Figure 2, where t12 
= t1. With t12 = t1 the equilibrium land rent is wt1*, implying that both entitlements are fully 
incorporated into higher land rents and are captured by landowners. In lower panel of Figure 
2, the maximum willingness to pay for entitlements (G1 and G12 for farm 1 and farm 2, 
respectively) is equal to their capitalisation level wt1* - w*. There is no incentive to purchase 
additional entitlements and their equilibrium price is zero, pt1 = pt12 = 0. 
5. Farm structural change 
In the previous section we assumed that the structure of the agricultural sector does not 
change. In reality, however, agriculture faces various structural adjustments, such as 
productivity shifts, farm entry and exit, which we consider in this section. Given that the SPS 
will probably also be in place in the next financial period 2013-20, the structural changes 
might be more pronounced in a long-run perspective. The effects analysed in this section 
have not been considered in the literature before and the results are new. 
5.1 Productivity change 
Changes at the aggregated sectoral level productivity may be caused by several factors. 
Firstly, the decoupling, which accompanied the introduction of the SPS, may have stimulated 
farm production adjustment leading to improved farm efficiency. Secondly, at the sectoral 
level productivity may increase trough the entry of new farms, which can be more dynamic 
and productive. Thirdly, cross-compliance and CAP greening requirements may induce an 
asymmetric increase in costs, resulting in a negative productivity shock. Fourthly, it may be 
induced by general improvement in the technology and rural institutions. Finally, the time 
gap between the reference period used for the entitlement allocation and the period of the 
SPS introduction (particularly the historical model) may have implications for land markets. 
The allocation of entitlements under the historical model was based on a historical reference 
period (2000–02), but not on the land used at the time of the SPS implementation (2005–
06). If productivity has changed between the two periods, then land use adjustments will take 
place. 
The dynamic distributional effects are different from the static distributional effects, 
especially if the entitlements are non-tradable. With productivity change, entitlement 
tradability reduces the capitalisation of the SPS, whereas barriers to entitlement trade 
increase the capitalisation of the SPS and thus benefits to landowners. Moreover, in the 
dynamic context the SPS may affect farm structural change in agriculture. With productivity 
change, entitlement tradability facilitates the structural adjustment, whereas barriers to 
entitlement may prevent land markets from full structural adjustments. The effects of 
productivity change can be best seen by considering deficit entitlements in perfectly 
competitive land markets with two types of heterogeneous farms, which is shown in Figure 
INCOME DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF DECOUPLED PAYMENTS | 15 
4.29 Farm 2 experiences an exogenous productivity improvement relative to farm 1. As above, 
to simplify the exposition, we assume that zero-cross compliance costs and that there are no 
greening requirements. 
First, consider free entitlement trade. An exogenous productivity improvement of farm 2 
increases its willingness to pay for land rent. This is illustrated in Figure 4, where the 
productivity advantage of farm 2 shifts its land demand from Dt2 D2 to Dtg2 Dg2 (dotted line), 
whereas the land demand of farm 1 is not affected (upper panel).30 With perfectly tradable 
entitlements the corresponding shift in equilibrium is from (A*, w*) to (Ag*, wg*), implying 
zero capitalisation of the SPS. Although, the equilibrium rent increases by wg* - w*, the SPS 
does not contribute to this increase. With or without a productivity advantage, the rent is 
entirely determined in the demand curves segment, which is not affected by the SPS, but is 
determined by the D1 and Dg2 part of land demand of farm 1 and farm 2, respectively. The 
rent increase is induced solely by the productivity advantage of farm 2. This is due to the fact 
the entitlement activation constraint is not binding ( 0=iλ ) – trade allows farm 1 to sell 
surplus entitlements AE1 – Ag* to farm 2 which has excess land. Because of deficit 
entitlements (i.e. strict inequality holds for equation (5)) competition among buyers will 
drive their price to their face value (equations (2) and (3)). The equilibrium amount of traded 
entitlements between farms is AE1 – Ag*. Farm 1 sells entitlements to farm 2 for a price equal 
to the face value of its entitlements, pt1 = t1 (Figure 4, lower panel). Overall, farms gain the 
full value of the SPS (area BEFGHI), whereas landowners do not benefit from the SPS.  
Next, consider land market equilibrium with non-tradable entitlements.31 Prohibitive 
barriers to entitlement trade imply that farm 1 cannot sell entitlements AE1 – Ag*. Instead, it 
uses the SPS to compete for land with the aim of retaining its land in order to be able to 
activate all entitlements. Otherwise, part of its entitlements and the corresponding benefit of 
the SPS would be lost to farm 1. In Figure 4 (upper panel) the non-tradability of entitlements 
implies that the land market equilibrium shifts from (A*, w*) (before the SPS) to (AE1, wt*) 
(with the SPS).32 As shown above, with freely tradable entitlements the equilibrium is at (Ag*, 
wg*), implying that with non-tradable entitlements, the SPS capitalisation into land rents is 
equal to wt* - wg*.33 Relative to the initial equilibrium (Ag*, rg*) without the SPS, farm 1 gains 
are equal to area BF. Farm 2 loses due to reduction in land use (area GK), while it gains the 
full value of the SPS (area I). Landowners’ benefits are equal to area EGK. This implies that 
entitlement, t1, is distributed between farm 1 (area BF), landowners (area E) and productivity 
loss due to a misallocation of land resources (area GH). Entitlement, t2, fully benefits farm 2 
(area I). 
In the presence of productivity change, the SPS may interact with farm restructuring and it 
may prevent land markets from full structural adjustments. Tradable entitlements allow full 
                                                        
29 The results are generally valid also for the case with surplus entitlements but the effects are similar 
to the case without structural change, because when the entitlement stock exceeds the total eligible 
area of land, the SPS is always capitalised into land rents. With surplus entitlements, the SPS is always 
capitalised into land rents. This is independent of whether we consider productivity change and 
whether entitlements are tradable or non-tradable. Only the difference in face value of entitlements 
among farms may have .enhanced impact on SPS capitalisation with productivity change. The intuition 
is analogous to the case of deficit entitlements. 
30 Note we assume asymmetric productivity change where relative increase of farm 2 productivity is 
higher than the productivity increase of farm 1. For simplicity with assume zero increase in 
productivity of latter type of farm, however the results hold in general. With symmetric productivity 
change the SPS effect is the same with and without entitlement tradability.   
31 This could occur either due to regulatory constraints or market imperfections, or both. 
32 Now the sale of entitlements (AE1 – At*) is not possible. As a result farm 1 uses the SPS to compete for 
land.  
33 Note that if the productivity increase of farm 2 is sufficiently high, then entitlement t1 is fully 
capitalised into land rents; in the opposite case if the productivity increase is sufficiently low, the 
capitalisation is zero even if the entitlements are not tradable. 
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adjustments on land markets, whereas entitlement trade restrictions hinder land relocation 
among farms. The allocation of entitlements between farms cannot fully adjust if entitlement 
trade is restricted. Instead, farms will use the SPS to compete for land. This effect is 
illustrated in Figure 4. 
To indentify the impact of the SPS on farm restructuring with tradable entitlements, the 
counterfactual is a situation without the SPS. As shown above, with and without the SPS, the 
productivity advantage of farm 2 (the increase of its land demand from D2 D2 to Dg2 Dg2) 
shifts the equilibrium from (A*, w*) to (Ag*, wg*). With and without the SPS, A*- Ag* amount of 
land is relocated from farm 1 to farm 2 implying that, when entitlement tradability is allowed, 
the SPS does not constrain farm restructuring.  
Next, consider the implications on farm restructuring with non-tradable entitlements. As 
shown above, with non-tradable entitlements the land market equilibrium is at (AEI, wt*) 
(Figure 4). This implies that land demand of more the productive farm 2 is greater with than 
without the tradability constraint (AT - Ag* > AT - AEI). The tradability constraint reduces the 
relocation of land. The relocation quantity with and without tradable entitlements is A* - Ag* 
and A* - AEI, respectively, where A* - Ag* > A* - AEI. The tradability constraint decreases land 
reallocation from farm 1 to farm 2 by AEI - Ag*. The more productive farm 2 cannot reach its 
optimal scale. Farm 1 uses the SPS to maintain higher land renting relative to what would be 
the case if entitlement trade would be possible or relative to no SPS. The total deadweight 
effect is equal to area GH. 
In summary, the entitlement trade allows farms to make decisions on the entitlement use and 
land renting separately from each other. The farm that experiences a lower relative 
productivity gain (i.e. farm 1) can detach its surplus entitlements from land by selling them, 
allowing in such a way to relocate unprofitable land to farms experiencing higher productivity 
increase (i.e. farm 2). However, if trade is constrained, then the relocation of entitlements 
cannot take place from the less to more productive farms. Farm 1 owning surplus entitlement 
(AEI - Ag*) in Figure 4 will use them to compete for land in order to activate the surplus 
entitlements. Otherwise the associated payment would be lost (i.e. (AEI - Ag*)t1). Hence, the 
counterfactual land market equilibrium is disturbed by policy rents.  
5.2 Farm entry/exit 
The entry/exit of farms can be triggered by changes in farm opportunity returns and/or farm 
profitability. Two issues are relevant with respect to farm entry and exit: the impact of farm 
entry and exit on land markets and entrants' eligibility to entitlement. As above, to simplify 
the analysis we assume zero-cross compliance costs and no greening requirements. 
Farms enter (exit) the sector, if their profits from farming are higher (lower) than the 
opportunity returns. A marginal farm which does not enter (exit) has profits just lower 
(higher) than the opportunity returns. An exogenous change in the relative returns will 
trigger the entry or exit of farms (i.e. farm 1 and/or farm 2). The entry into the farming sector 
stimulates the demand for land, if entrants are more productive than the incumbent farms. 
As with productivity change, it will shift the aggregate land demand upward. The exit of 
farms has the opposite effect on land market, causing a downward shift in land demand.  
The effect of the SPS in the presence of farm exit/entry is analogous to a negative/positive 
productivity change, implying the qualitatively similar effects to productivity change analysed 
in the previous section. The exit (entry) of type 1 farms implies a downward (upward) shift in 
their respective land demand leading to the same SPS impact on income distribution and 
farm restructuring as an equivalent productivity decrease (increase).  
The results derived above are conditional upon the SPS linked to the incumbent farms. The 
entrants (who are potentially more dynamic and more productive and therefore a source of 
productivity growth) are excluded from the SPS support system. To address these concerns, a 
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national ‘reserve’ was created in each MS.34 National reserves can be used to allocate 
entitlements to i) farms in a special situation, ii) new entrants and iii) farms in regions 
subject to restructuring. The European Commission’s proposal of 2011 outlines, among 
others, the priority use of national reserve to young farmers who start farming. Further, the 
European Commission proposal envisages a redistribution of entitlements with the start of 
the new financial framework in 2014. The redistribution of entitlements may stimulate entry, 
as it will allow new entrants to obtain entitlements. Similar behaviour was observed with the 
hybrid model (e.g. Sweden and Finland) with the introduction of the SPS in 2005 (Ciaian, 
Kancs & Swinnen, 2010).  
In general, the entrants’ eligibility for the SPS stimulates the capitalisation of the SPS into 
land values. The entrant eligibility to the SPS creates similar effects to the surplus 
entitlements. The expansion of the stock of entitlements relative to the eligible land creates a 
stronger upward pressure on land rents, leading to a higher leakage of the SPS to landowners. 
The overall effect of entrants’ eligibility for the SPS depends particularly on the relative share 
of new and initially (incumbent) allocated entitlements relative to the eligible area. To 
illustrate the effect we consider the case with deficit non-tradable entitlements without cross-
compliance and greening requirements.35 
Allowing entrants to obtain the SPS increases the overall stock of entitlements. The actual 
increase depends on the size of the reserve. This effect is illustrated in Figure 5. We consider 
a case whereby only the entrants of farm type 2 can obtain new entitlements. Assuming the 
opportunity return unchanged, the entry of marginal farm of type 2 is triggered because of an 
increase in policy return due to its eligibility for the SPS. The initial entitlements of farm 2 is 
AE2 = AT – AE and we assume that new entrants can obtain up to A* – AE2 new entitlements, 
thus increasing the stock of type 2 entitlement to AE22 (= AT – AE2). Farm 1 is assumed to have 
the same amount of entitlements, AE1. The overall stock of entitlements exceeds the total 
land, AE1 + AE22 > AT implying that the activation constraints of farm i will be binding ( 0>iλ ), 
and hence all land will benefit from SPS (equation (5)). The SPS increases the willingness to 
pay for rent, 
surplus
SPS
ii
A tpf 0>+  (equations (1) and (2) and 0>iλ ), compared to a situation without 
entrants' eligibility for entitlements, 
deficit
SPS
i
Apf 0>  (equations (1) and (2) and 0=iλ ), implying a 
capitalisation of the SPS into land rents in the former case. In Figure 5 the equilibrium shifts 
from (A*, w*) without entrant eligibility to entitlements to (AEI, wt*) with entrant eligibility to 
entitlements. Relative to non-eligibility of entrants to entitlements, landowners benefit (area 
CDEGI) due to increase of land rent by wt* - w*, farm 2 loses policy gains (area IJ) but gains 
due to land use increase (area FHJ), whereas farm 1 loses part of the SPS (area C) and due to 
land use reduction (area DE).36  
The overall impact also depends on the face value of entitlements allocated to the entrants. If 
the value differs with respect to the incumbent entitlements, then the entitlement 
heterogeneity increases, causing similar effects to those analysed in the previous section on 
the implications of different SPS models. 
                                                        
34 Under the current SPS regulation, the MS must create a national reserve by linearly reducing (up to 
3%) their national SPS ceiling. There are also other sources that may enlarge the national reserve, e.g. 
the unused entitlements for three years, non-attributed entitlements and revenue collected from the 
entitlement trade taxes. 
35 With surplus entitlements, the impact of entrants’ eligibility for entitlements is minor as 
entitlements are already in surplus relative to land and cause their capitalisation in land rents. The 
only difference in the face value between old and new entitlements may have similar implications to 
deficit entitlements.  
36 Note that because we assume non-tradable entitlements, the SPS constrains farm restructuring. The 
effects are analogous to those derived in the previous section.   
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6. Distributional effects, market imperfections and regulations 
Rural land markets are often constrained by various rigidities and imperfections (Ciaian, 
Kancs & Swinnen, 2010). Market imperfections can either increase or decrease the 
capitalisation rate of the SPS. The two most important imperfections identified in the 
literature are credit market imperfections, which usually increase the capitalisation rate, and 
land market institutions and regulations, which usually restrict rental market adjustments to 
the SPS (Ciaian & Swinnen, 2009).  
6.1 Credit market imperfections  
The agricultural sector is perceived to have significant credit problems, mainly due to the 
nature of production and the risk specific to agriculture that is present to a lesser extent in 
other sectors of the economy (Barry & Robison, 2001). Studies show that this is also the case 
in developed countries such as EU and the USA (Blancard et al., 2006; Lee & Chambers, 
1986; Färe, Grosskopf & Lee, 1990).  
The presence of credit constraint in the farming sector increases the capitalisation of the SPS 
and policy rents to farmers and/or landowners. We illustrate the credit constraint effect with 
surplus entitlements in Figure 6 (which is an extension of Figure 2). To simplify the 
exposition, we assume non-tradable entitlements ( 0=γ ), no cross-compliance costs ( 0=ic ) 
and no greening requirements. Without credit market imperfections, the land market 
equilibrium with the SPS is at (At*, wt*), implying that the wt* - w* part of the SPS is 
capitalised into land rents. 
According to Ciaian and Swinnen (2009), farms facing credit constraint may use subsidies to 
substitute for missing finances. This has important implications for the land market, as more 
credit may stimulate investment in technology and/or an increase in input use, leading to 
higher land productivity and thereby exerting upward pressure on land rents. In our model 
the credit constraint effect is reflected in an upward shift in land demands. To simplify the 
exposition, in Figure 6 we assume that only land demand of farm 2 increases due to credit 
constraint. The demand of farm 1 is not affected (i.e. farm 1 is not credit constrained). 
The SPS has two effects on land rents: one direct and one indirect. The direct effect of the 
SPS is shown in the previous section in absence of credit market imperfections, and is equal 
to a rental price increase by wt* - w*. The indirect effect results is a result of the relaxed credit 
constraint of farm 2, which due to the SPS allows an improvement of its technology to be 
financed. This increases the productivity of land (assuming that farm 2 are credit 
constrained), which further increases the land demand of farm 2, resulting in higher rent, 
which reinforces the direct effect. The indirect credit constraint effect results in a shift in land 
demands from D2 Dt2 to Dcc2 Dtcc2 (dotted lines), for farm 2. The new equilibrium is at (At*, 
wtcc*). Compared to perfect credit markets, the SPS marginal capitalisation into land rents 
has increased by wtcc* - wt*. The landowners' gains are equal to area DF (policy gain) and area 
CE (productivity induced gain). Farm 1 gains area B, whereas farm 2 does not gain from the 
SPS.37 The credit constraint effect depends on the size of the credit constraint. The more 
credit constrained the farms are, the larger the productivity effect, and hence the higher the 
marginal capitalisation of the SPS.38  
6.2 Land market institutions and regulations 
The rental market arrangements in the EU may either involve rental price controls or 
provisions on the duration of rental contracts. The rental price controls, such as minimum or 
maximum prices, are usually imposed by government, whereas the duration of rental 
                                                        
37 In Figure 6 we assume a parallel shift in land demand of farm 2. In reality this may not be the case, 
implying that farm 2 may even lose from the SPS (Ciaian & Swinnen, 2009). 
38 Even if the SPS does not affect land rents directly, e.g. with deficit and tradable entitlements and no 
cross-compliance and no greening, its interaction with credit markets may lead to higher land rents. 
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contracts can be regulated through both formal governmental interventions and/or through 
informal rural market institutions (Ciaian, Kancs & Swinnen, 2010).  
Of particular importance for the SPS capitalisation is the maximum price intervention. The 
potential capitalisation of the SPS into land rents will be reduced in the presence of a rental 
price ceiling. The duration of rental contracts also has an important implication for rental 
price adjustments. Ceteris paribus, long-term rental contracts for agricultural land will 
adjust less to policy changes than short-term contracts. According to Ciaian, Kancs and 
Swinnen (2010), the key determinants of rental contract durations in the EU are social norms 
(such as in Greece), governmental regulations (e.g. there is a minimum of nine years in 
Belgium and France, six years in the Netherlands and five in Spain), and market institutions 
(e.g. Germany, Italy, Sweden). Moreover, in several countries (e.g. France) even the renewal 
of rental contracts is regulated. 
This is shown in Figure 2, where the equilibrium rent with the SPS (with entitlements t1 and 
t2) is wt*. If the rental price cannot adjust, e.g. due to land market rigidities, then the actual 
rent that farms pay will be lower. In Figure 2 the actual rent will lie between wt* and w*, 
depending on the rigidity of land markets. This implies that the SPS capitalisation will be 
lower with market rigidities than without at least in the short-run (i.e. it will be lower than 
wt* - w*). However, in the long run the rent will have the tendency to adjust upward to wt* 
with renewal of rental contracts. Upon renewal of rental contracts, competitive pressures will 
motivate landowners to adjust rents upward. For example, Kilian et al. (2012) estimate for 
Bavaria (Germany) that rental prices for contracts signed in the first year of SPS 
implementation (i.e. in 2005) were 16 to 20% higher due to SPS relative to previous coupled 
payments capitalisation. On the other hand, to overcome the rental price regulation (i.e. the 
maximum price intervention), farmers will have the incentive to pay unofficial payments 
(bribes) to landowners to prevent the loss of land to competing farms. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that this indeed happens in countries with strong rental price regulation (Ciaian, 
Kancs & Swinnen, 2010). For example, if we assume that the maximum rental price is set to 
be equal to the pre-SPS rent w*, then farmers will have an incentive to pay a bribe to 
landowners equal up to wt* - w*, thus indirectly channelling part of the SPS to landowners 
(area EFHK), leaving farmers policy gain equal to area C.   
7. Conclusions 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the impacts of decoupled payments in the EU – the SPS – 
by explicitly capturing the income distributional effects and farm restructuring in the presence of 
dynamic effects, such as exogenous productivity change and farm entry/exit, and market 
imperfections and institutional rigidities. For this purpose we adopt the land market model of 
Ciaian and Swinnen (2006), which allows us to capture both the static and dynamic distributional 
effects of the SPS on rural land markets. 
Our results suggest that the entitlement stock effect, barriers to entitlement trade and credit 
market imperfections increase the capitalisation rate of the SPS, whereas the cross-compliance 
and the CAP greening, the tradability of entitlements, variation in the face value of entitlements, 
and land market institutions and regulations reduce the capitalisation rate of the SPS. These 
results suggest that the SPS implication details are highly significant: farmers’ benefits can range 
from 100% of the SPS value to a negative policy incidence. 
These findings are consistent with empirical evidence. For example, Ciaian, Kancs and Michalek 
(2011) find that around 6-7% of the total SPS are capitalised into land rents in EU-15. They also 
find that there is a large variation in the capitalisation rate for different SPS levels and between 
different implementation models of the SPS, ranging from 3 to 94%.  
The second important finding of our paper is that the SPS may have an undesirable effect on farm 
restructuring, if entitlement trade is constrained. The access to land of expanding farms or new 
entrants may be constrained by less productive farms motivated to preserve land use in order to 
retain the policy gain. This undesirable effect can be avoided or lessened by improving and/or 
enhancing entitlement tradability. 
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Figure 1. The effect of the SPS with deficit entitlements 
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Figure 2. The effect of the SPS with surplus entitlements 
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Figure 3. Trade and price of entitlements 
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Figure 4. The effect of the SPS with productivity change 
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Figure 5. The effect of the SPS with entrants’ eligibility for entitlements   
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Figure 6. The effect of the SPS with credit market imperfections 
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